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Dynamic Measurement Protocol in Infrastructure as a Service
Shuang Xiang, Bo Zhao , An Yang, and Tao Wei
Abstract: Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) has brought advantages to users because virtualization technology
hides the details of the physical resources, but this leads to the problem of users being unable to perceive their
security. This defect has obstructed cloud computing from wide-spread popularity and development. To solve this
problem, a dynamic measurement protocol in IaaS is presented in this paper. The protocol makes it possible for
the user to get the real-time security status of the resources, thereby solving the problem of guaranteeing dynamic
credibility. This changes the cloud service security provider from the operator to the users themselves. This study
has verified the security of the protocol by means of Burrow-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic, and the result shows that
it can satisfy requirements for innovation, privacy, and integrity. Finally, based on different IaaS platforms, this study
has conducted a performance analysis to demonstrate that this protocol is reliable, secure, and efficient.
Key words: Burrow-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic; real-time security; trusted dynamic measurement
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Introduction

With the rapid development of cloud computing, a
variety of cloud computing service models have been
proposed by NIST, including Software as a Service
(SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure
as a Service (IaaS)[1] which are currently the most
widely accepted. IaaS is the most basic kind of cloud
service model, which can be customized according to
users’ needs and decreases the overhead of deploying
hardware. The concept of virtualization with flexibility
and freedom has been widely accepted. Recently, some
large IT companies have begun to offer IaaS services
to the public: Amazon’s EC2 is a representative
product[2] . However, with the popularity of IaaS
applications, its potential security problems have
gradually drawn researchers’ attention. The main
threats in IaaS include three aspects: infrastructure
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sharing will lead to uncontrolled access of users and
operating systems, the integrity of the resources used
by the user cannot be proven, and there are no relevant
security protocols to protect the communication process
between users and cloud. These threats have seriously
blocked the popularization and development of cloud
computing.
Researchers have launched a series of studies to
solve these problems. Nuno et al.[3] proposed a TCCP
architecture, Khan et al.[4] proposed the credible
Eucalyptus cloud, while Cui et al.[5] proposed a trusted
IaaS framework. The above researches all started from
the perspective of service providers by designing a
series of secure protocols and architectures to constrain
the node behavior, so as to ensure the credibility
of the service providing process. However, these
studies are based on a series of protocols focusing
on constraining the process of Virtual Machine (VM)
booting and migration, which means that users are
unable to master the resource security and flexibility
is affected. Furthermore, users cannot perceive whether
a running node environment is safe, and these designs
cannot resist against a TOCTOU attack.
Bertholon et al.[6] proposed a TCRR protocol
from the users’ considerations for security, which
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can validate specific VMs, according to users’
requirements. However, this process does not involve a
trusted third party and does not consider the dynamic
measurement of runtime VMs, thus being unable
to ensure dynamic credibility. In addition, protocol
security analysis and proof is an important part of the
design. Only through integrated formal verification can
potential security issues and defects be detected in the
protocols and thereby avoid security attacks, but the
majority of the above-mentioned research work has no
strict formal analysis or verification, and there may be
potential security threats.
We have designed a provably secure IaaS layer
protocol that allows users to put forward measure
requests and to obtain the real-time trusted status of the
resources they are using. The cloud service provider
is responsible for measurement implementation in the
protocol, and a trusted third party is responsible for
the certificate and the verification of measurement
results. The separation of measurement and
validation processes increases the users’ perception
of credibility. Compared with previous works, the
protocol allows users to manage measurement points
and measurement components by themselves, which
enhances management flexibility. The dynamic
measurement of optional components avoids static
metrics TOCTOU attacks. Finally, the introduction
of a trusted third party increases the credibility of
the results. Based on different IaaS management
platforms, this paper has also implemented the
specific protocol including the integrated process from
dynamic measurement to verification, and conducted
performance analysis.

2

Protocol Design

The security of registers, user initiation, and migration
of virtual machines[3-5] has been improved through IaaS
layer management software platforms in the cloud,
but the run-time security of user resources cannot be
guaranteed. The IaaS layer structure itself determines
whether the user is vulnerable to attacks when using
resources, and because service providers often provide a
shared infrastructure, physical node hardware resources
for system users are not completely isolated. Therefore,
when one user is attacked, other active users are
vulnerable, so they need to know the real-time security
status of resources in order to protect the security of
their own resources. This process is often achieved by
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dynamic measurement.
To measure all user resources in a cloud environment
dynamically is inefficient and unnecessary, and does
not address how to ensure the legitimacy of the user’s
identity nor the authenticity of the result. Based on these
challenges, this paper designs a dynamic measurement
protocol in the IaaS layer. It guarantees the dynamic
credibility of resources and customizes the component
list according to user requirements, thus changing the
provider of cloud services from the operator to the
users.
2.1

Key components

The IaaS layer of a cloud management software
platform is the core environment management control
component; the users are the clients who use it; while
the node physical machine in the cloud environment, the
operating system installed on the physical machine, the
virtual machine monitor, and the virtual machine are the
direct providers of user resources. The node’s physical
machine is the actual carrier of the operating systems,
virtual machines, and virtual machine monitors, so from
the physical point of view, they are a unit which we
can consider as a whole in the protocol design called
cloud nodes. A virtual machine disk image storage
management area is used to store and manage virtual
machine templates, users’ virtual machine images,
snapshots, and so on.
Users read into the concrete physical machine
when needed, so we can assume that the data in
the virtual machine disk image storage management
zone is static. They are secure, and their security
can be protected by other means such as encryption,
so the design of our protocol does not involve this
component. Finally, this protocol requires a trusted third
party for certificate issuance, as well as management
and verification of the results from the Cloud Node
(CN) metric. In summary, this protocol mainly involves
four components, and their relationships are shown in
Fig. 1.
User. The users of IaaS resources use various
resources in cloud environments through the cloud
management software platform. They hope to obtain
security of their own resources.
Iaas Cloud Management Software Platform
(CMSP). The IaaS layer management software
platform is the core component of the entire IaaS
layer. It manages and controls the node physical
machine, existing disk image area, virtual machine
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Fig. 1

Protocol components’ relationship.

monitor, and virtual machines running on the physical
machine, and it also provides interfaces for users to
access and use. Current open source IaaS management
software platforms include Eucalyptus[7] , OpenStack[8] ,
and OpenNebula[9] .
CN. The CN is the physical machine that stores
the resources that the user desires to keep in a safe
state. The process of accepting a measure request
sent by the CMSP, launching dynamic metrics, and
producing a report that is sent to a Trusted Measure
Agent (TMA), a trusted third party, requires the key
support of the TPM.
TMA. We propose an additional component based on
common IaaS architecture called the TMA. The TMA is
a trusted third party that is in charge of certification and
responsible for the management and validation of the
metric results from the CN. The report will be returned
to the user by the TMA.
2.2

The main interaction process

Based on the four components of Section 2.1, the
interactive process of the design of this protocol is
shown in Fig. 2. The process enables the user to know
the security status of resources in real-time according

Fig. 2

to their own needs through public key encryption
and signature technology. In the meantime, it ensures
the legitimacy of user identity, the confidentiality of
data transmission, and the authenticity of dynamic
measurement results.
(1) USR! CMSP: SIGUsr fCNID , fUserID ; nonce,
mList(item1 , item2 ,    ) g AIKPUB
CN g
According to user’s need, we first use AIKPUB of
the corresponding node to encrypt the component list
whose security status the user wants to obtain. The
user then uses their private key to sign the encrypted
component list and sends it to CMSP.
(2) CMSP ! CNi fUserID ; nonce; mList.item1 ; item2 ;
   /gAIKPUB
CN
CMSP uses AIKPUB
CN to verify the user’s identity and
message integrity. If the message is correct, CMSP
sends the encrypted information to the corresponding
CN node, according to the encrypted message.
(3) CNi ! TMA: SIGN fUserID ; nouce; CNID ; TPMID ;
SML; mList.item1 ; item2 ;    /g
The node receives the request and decrypts it using
the AIKPVR
CN . Then, the node initiates a dynamic
measurement according to mList. After the process
of dynamic measurement, CN makes a measurement
report. The report includes Storage Measurement
Log (SML) stored in TPM, name of CN, user ID, user
nonce, user measurement list, and version. Finally, CN
node signs the report and sends it to TMA.
(4) TMA ! User W fresult, noncegAIKPUB
User
After receiving all the information, TMA extends and
restores the order of all the recording points in the log
according to the measurement Log( ). By calculating
Hash(UserID ; nonce; CNID ; TPMID ; PCRivalue /. TMA
verifies the integrity of the information. If verification
is successful, then it returns result D ok, otherwise it
returns result D false. Finally, TMA uses AIKPUB
User to
encrypt the result and nonce, then sends it to the user.

Interaction process of protocol.
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Security Proof of Protocol

3.1

Terms and rules of BAN logic

Burrow-Abadi-Needham (BAN) is a modal logic
based on knowledge and belief[10] . In the BAN logic
ratiocination, we first convert the protocol messages to
idealized protocol, then we make a reasonable postulate
according to specific circumstances, and ratiocinate
based on protocol and postulate. The main beliefs that
participate in the protocol constantly change with the
message. Finally, we check whether the protocol can
achieve the desired objectives[11] .
In addition, we use the following terms:
P j  X W P believes X I
P C X W P sees xI
P j  X W P once said X I
pj ) X W P has jurisdiction over X I
].X/ W The formula X is freshI
K

j ! P W P has K as a public keyI
fXgK W This represents the formula X encrypted under
the key K;
K

P ! QW P and Q may use the shared key K to
communication;
K

P ” QW The formula K is a secret known only to
P and QI
< X >Y W This represents X combined with the
formula Y; it is intended that Y be a secret, and
that its presence prove the identity of whoever utter
< x >y :
There are 19 logical rules in BAN logic. The
following are the rules that we use in the proof
procedure:
K

R1:

P j  Q ” P P C XK
I
P j  Qj  X

R2:

P j  j ! Q P C XK
P j  Qj  X

K

1

;

K

P j  Q ” P P C XK
;
PC X
P j  ].X /
R4:
;
P j  ].X; Y /
P j  ].X/; P j  Qj  X
R5:
;
P j  Qj  X
P j  Qj  .X; Y /
R6:
;
P j  Qj  X
P j  Qj H) X; P j  Qj  X
:
R7:
Pj  X
3.2 Security analysis of protocol
R3:

3.2.1

The idealized protocol

According to the protocol process described in Section
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2.2 and the general analysis method of BAN, the
idealized protocol is shown below:
M1: User ! CMSP: fCNID ; ].nonce/; fUserID ;
1
nonce; mList(item1 ; item2 ;    /gKCN gKUser
I
M2: CMSP ! CN W fUserID ; nonce; mList.item1 ;
item2 ;    /gKCN ;
M3: CN ! TMA: fUserID ; nonce; CNID ; TPMID ;
SML; mList.item1 ; item2 ;    /gKCN1 I
M4: TMA! User : fresult nonceg KUser :
3.2.2

The idealized assume

A1:Userj  ].nonce/I
KUser

A2:CMSPj  j ! UserI
KCN

A3:TMAj  j ! CNI
KUser

A4:CNj  User ” CNI
KUser

A5:Userj  TMA ” User:
3.2.3

Security objectives and analysis

The protocol in Section 2 consists of two parts. The
first part is that the user sends the message to the
CMSP, and then the CMSP sends the message to the
CN before the beginning of the measurement. Based on
the security requirements of the protocol, the goals of
this part are for the CMSP to trust the legitimacy of
measurement information sources, and for the CN to
trust the confidentiality of the information. The second
part is that the CN sends the measurement report to
the TMA after the measurement procedure. The goals of
this part are that the TMA trusts the authenticity of the
measurement information sources, and the user trusts
the authenticity and novelty of the result. The security
of the measurement process depends on the TPM on the
CN.
According to BAN logic syntax, we abstract the
security objectives and prove them as follows.
(1) CMSPj  Userj  CNID
Using M1, We have
CMSPCfCNID ; ].nonce/; fUserID ; nonce; mList.item1 ;
1
item2 ;    /gKCN gKUser
:
By initialization postulate A1 and using rule R2, we
have
CMSPj  Userj  .CNID ; ].nonce/; fUserID ; nonce;
mList(item1 ; item2 ;    /g/;
Using rule R5, We can prove that
CMSPj  Userj  CNID :
(2) CNj  Userj .UserID ; nonce; mList.item1 ; item2 ;
   //
Using M1, we have
CN C fUserID ; nonce; mList.item1 ; item2 ;    /g
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Using postulate A4 and rule R1, we have
CNj  Userj  .UserID ; nonce; mList.item1 ; item2 ;
   //:
(3) TMAj  CNj  .UserID ; nonce; CNID ; TPMID ;
SML; mList.item1 ; item2 ;    //
Using M3, we have
TMA C fUserID ; nonce; CNID ; TPMID ; SML;
mList.item1 ; item2 ;    /gKCN1 :
Using postulate A3 and rule R5, we have our proof.
(4) Userj  TMAj  .result; nonce/
Using M4, A4, and rule R1, we have
Userj  TMAj  .result, nonce):
(5) Userj].result; nonce/
Using M4, we have
User C .result, nonce/:
Using A4 and rule R3, we have
User C .result, nonce/:
Using A1 and rule R4, we can prove
Userj].result, nonce/:
With the above proof, we learn that the design of the
protocol can satisfy our security requirements. That is
to say, with the premise that the TPM could guarantee
the security of the measurement process, our design
of the protocol is secure and reliable. It can satisfy
all the requirements of originality, confidentiality, and
integrity.

request and the list of measuring, and guarantees the
run-time security of user resources by dynamic
measurement techniques. So in the concrete
implementation, we need to design and realize the
dynamic measurement process of cloud nodes as well
as the interaction process of the protocol.

4

A full virtualized environment running on CN node
includes HypervisorDomain 0 and Domain U. The
structure of our design of the trusted measurement
module is shown in Fig. 3.
We set a measurement module in Hypervisor and
a control module in Domain 0 of each node. The

Experiment and Performance Analysis

In the design of the protocol described in Section 2,
dynamic measurement is a fundamental component
of this protocol. The cloud node initiates the dynamic
measurement by accepting the user’s measurement

Fig. 3

4.1

Dynamic measurement technology

TPM-based static integrity measurement methods
ensure the integrity protection of platform boot time, but
cannot ensure runtime security of the platform. Based
on this, Intel and AMD have respectively put forward
their own dynamic measurement root technology. Their
core idea is that we can allow the system to measure the
integrity at the current time from any untrusted status as
a starting point of measurement. The trusted computing
specification[12] has also distinguished between static
PCR and dynamic PCR. It defines that PCR17-23 is a
dynamic trusted root and can only be reset by a dynamic
trusted root.
The technologies proposed by Intel and AMD are
Intel TXT[13] and AMD SVM[14] respectively, and they
have almost the same principle. In this paper, we used
Intel TXT technology.
4.2

Implementation of trusted measurement in
cloud

Dynamic measurement process.

Shuang Xiang et al.: Dynamic Measurement Protocol in Infrastructure as a Service

measurement module is designed to measure the virtual
domain as well as its internal components. While
the System Management Mode (SMM) guarantees
the security of both the measurement modules and
Hypervisor itself, the control module is intended to
obtain the metrics reports from the TPM module and
to send the report to the TMA.
The measurement process is as follows: (1)
Initialization of the operation starts the process. In the
process of starting Domain U, the process of setting
the interrupt table is intercepted in order to preserve
the assigned address of the virtual machine vCPU
structure and mark the virtual machine that is running;
(2) The CMSP triggers the SMI remotely via IPMI
and BMC, and then the SMI dynamically executes
the measurement to the VMM and the measurement
modules within the VMM; (3) After the measure gets
passed, the metrics program is triggered via a super
call created by the measurement module. According to
the user’s measure requests to the kernel image, system
call table, interrupt table, and the exception table, as
well as the super-sensitive data field, a part or all of
the dynamic integrity measurement is conducted. (4)
After the measurement, the control module in Domain 0
obtains the relevant PCR values and produces a measure
status report that will be sent to the TMA.
4.3

Performance analysis

The security and effectiveness of the protocols in the
practical application is the crucial factor whether the
protocols can be widely used or not[15] , as well as
whether the new protocol will affect the performance of
the original platform. Based on the two points above,
this paper has carried out a testing analysis for the
effectiveness and security of the protocol, as well as the
effect that the protocol has on the original platform.
Our experimental environment is as follows:
Three servers equipped with Intel 2.0 GHz X5620*2
processors, 128 GB memory, and Western Digital 4 TB
Raid 3 hard disks. Each server carries an ST TPM1.2
security chip for building the CMSP and CN as well as
the trusted third party, respectively. For software, the
operating system referred to in this paper uses SELS

Fig. 4
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11 sp1 or Ubuntu 12.04 Server Edition, while Xen 4.0
is chosen to be the virtual machine monitor. The IaaS
layer management software platform is Eucalyptus 3.1,
OpenStack E3, and OpenNebula 3.6 for conducting the
implementation analysis.
4.3.1

Effectiveness

In order to verify whether the protocol is able to work
effectively, the paper carried out an implementation
of the protocol on three servers to judge whether
the protocol can perform securely and effectively. We
have established a remote login environment on a
TMA server with JSP displaying pages and postgreSQL
storing encrypted measure results. The components that
users can select include kernel images, the system call
table, interrupt table, and super call table. After the
measurement of the selected component, users can log
into the TMA to view the results.
In our experiment, users use four different
virtual machine instances to measure different
components. Before users start the measurement, we
attacked the third virtual machine instances to modify
the kernel permissions table, and the measurement
results after the attack are shown in Fig. 4. The
components marked red indicate that they are under
attack while those marked blue are those not selected
by users for measuring. It indicates that the experiment
has reflected the trusted status of a different virtual
machine instance in a timely and effectively manner.
4.3.2

Security

In order to verify whether this protocol can
resist existing common attacks against the trusted
measurement platform, we conducted a secure test
on the protocol by simulating replay attacks, forgery
attacks, and channel stealing. The additional premise of
our attack test is that the TMA and the TPM, as well as
all the private keys, are safe.
In the replay attack, we assume that there exist some
security problems in Hypervisor. The attacker can make
use of the communication module deployed in Xen
Hypervisor to obtain the measuring control information
of the CMSP and deliver the information out of date
to the TMA. For a forgery attack, we assume that the

Report of measuring results.
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attacker can get part of the CN permissions, thereby
being able to try to falsify measurement results. In
a channel attack, we assume that the attacker can
intercept data transmission at any time and try replacing
part of the data. The results of the experiment are shown
in Table 1.
The results show that in the replay attacks, since
the authentication information has utilized random
numbers to guarantee data freshness, the TMA finds
the random number in the report is inconsistent when
verifying the measurement report, thus detecting that
the platform has been attacked. The success of forgery
attacks and channel attacks depends on the safety
of modern cryptography, but we can assume that an
attacker cannot achieve the purpose of attack due to the
existing public key cryptography system.
4.3.3

Effect on the performance of the cloud
platform

The protocol designed in this paper has improvements
that have added some communication interaction and
platform measurement, which may lead to an effect
on performance. The communication interaction mainly
involves package sending and receiving, as well as
some simple encryption and decryption. Compared with
the overhead of platform measurement, the impact of
communication interaction on the cloud platform can
be ignored, so we will focus on the evaluation of the
measurement’s performance overhead of the original
platform. In addition, we also measure the time cost
from user-initiated dynamic measurement request to
receiving results under laboratory conditions.
We have tested performance overhead for
management software in different IaaS layers. Since
in this protocol, users can selectively measure the
component list, during our measurement tests, we
just consider the maximum overhead situation, i.e.,
selecting all components for measurement to verify
Table 1

whether the measurement overhead of the system will
have impacts on user experience. In this paper, we have
gathered the statistical data of measurement time for
five times and the results are shown in Fig. 5.
The experiments show that for different IaaS
platforms, the overhead is between 600 and 800. The
measurement time cost from users initiating dynamic
measurement to receiving the final result is between
1000 and 1600 ms. We can see that there is a tiny system
overhead for the protocol on different platforms which
will not impact the performance of the original cloud
platform and the user’s actual experience.

5

Conclusions

Existing technologies and methods cannot guarantee the
dynamics and credibility of the IaaS layer resources. To
solve this problem, we propose a dynamic trust
measurement protocol in the IaaS layer that can
be proved to be secure. It allows users to take
the initiative for dynamic measurement requests for
resources used in cloud environments according to
their needs, and can customize the measurement list to
improve flexibility. Meanwhile, the protocol solves the
problem whereby traditional research cannot guarantee
the dynamics and credibility of user resources, and
changes the cloud service security provider from the
operator to the users. This has greatly improved the
flexibility. In this paper, the process for measuring
and controlling and the process for verifying and
managing measurement results are separated, so that
the administrator of the cloud CLC cannot know or
tamper with the final results, improving the credibility
of the results for the user. In this paper, the protocol
is implemented on different IaaS platforms. The results
show that it can dynamically protect the integrity of user

The results of attack experiment.

Analysis of the results
Attack
Effective or not
Replay When TMA verifies the measuring
No
report, the inconsistent nonce is found
which means that attack is detected.
Forgery Since the attacker cannot obtain
No
private keys and the right of
controlling TPM, he is unable to
make a valid report.
Channel The data packets have been signed or
No
encrypted, thus cannot be changed.

Fig. 5

Time overhead.
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resources and will not impact the performance of the
original cloud platform and user experience.
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